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TRY, TRY: Sutton, left, and Pfeffer have kind words for failure—and the learning
it occasions.
Glenn Matsumura |
Jeffrey Pfeffer, PhD ’72, and Robert I. Sutton would like to foment a little revolution—one in which leaders in business and the world at large base their decisions on facts and logic, not ideology, hunches, management fads or poorly understood experience. Pfeffer, the Thomas D. Dee II Professor of Organizational Behavior, and Sutton, a professor of management science and engineering and, by courtesy, of organizational behavior in the Graduate School of Business, are the authors of Hard Facts, Dangerous Half-Truths, and Total Nonsense: Profiting from Evidence-Based Management (Harvard Business School Press, 2006). STANFORD asked them about bringing more reason to organizational life.
What’s some of the total nonsense that occurs in companies?
Sutton: Probably the biggest single problem for human decision making is that when people have ingrained beliefs, they will put a much higher bar for evidence for things they don’t believe than for things they do believe. Confirmation-seeking bias, I think, is what social psychologists call it. Organizations can have amazingly good evidence, but it has no effect on the decisions they make if it conflicts with their ideology.
Do you have a favorite unsupported belief?
Pfeffer: One would be stock options. There are more than 200 studies that show no evidence that there is a relationship between the amount of equity senior executives have and a company’s financial performance. . . . Just as you would never bet on a point spread on a football game because it encourages bad behavior, you should not reward people for increasing the spread in an expectations market.
Overreliance on financial incentives of all sorts drives all kinds of counterproductive behavior.
Evidence-based management derives from evidence-based medicine. Explain what kind of decision making we’re talking about.
Pfeffer: Almost any decision you make about any sort of intervention can be evidence-based in the sense that you can try to access what research literature and evaluation literature demonstrate about this. It’s a way of thinking more scientifically and systematically.
Sutton: The way a good doctor or a good manager works—we call it the attitude of wisdom—is to act with knowledge while doubting what you know. So if a patient goes to a doctor, you hope the doctor would do two things: first look at the literature and make the best decision given what’s available. Then actually track the progress of the treatment and see what unexpected side effects you’re having and what things are working.
And that same thing can be what happens with management. Harrah’s is an interesting case because then-COO Gary Loveman took what was known about how to make service-based organization more effective and implemented it in Harrah’s. Casinos produce lots of data, and Loveman was determined to base his decisions on that data and to do small experiments. He soon discovered that much of the conventional wisdom in the gaming industry was wrong. [For example: After he learned that local residents, not high rollers from elsewhere, were some of Harrah’s most profitable customers, Harrah’s tried promotions that de-emphasized free rooms and food, in favor of free chips.]
Does evidence-based management minimize the role of people’s experience or their intuition?
Sutton: We’re not saying scientists should replace people who practice the craft. Medicine and management are both crafts, and you can only learn to do them well by doing them over and over. But an individual doctor can’t tell if Vioxx causes heart problems because one person’s practice isn’t big enough to determine that evidence. It’s similar if you’re one manager thinking about making a merger decision, or implementing ERP [enterprise resource planning], or putting in incentive-based pay; a good manager will look at larger evidence in terms of informing the decision.
Why is experimentation underused in business?
Pfeffer: There’s a tendency for people to read a book or to go to a seminar and believe that if what they’ve learned is worth doing, it’s worth doing everywhere all at once. As opposed to saying, “Here’s an idea: maybe it works; maybe it doesn’t; maybe it could work, if we tweaked it a little.” Only by trying it in a few places and not trying it in other places and trying it in different ways can you actually learn from experience.
Hewlett-Packard experimented with different forms of incentive pay: they said it may work; it may not work; we’ll try it; we’ll try it in various places, in different ways in different places. Then Carly Fiorina came in and threw out all the knowledge they had learned. But they had learned a lot. It wasn’t a huge top-down thing or a following-that-fad thing—it was the spirit of inquiry, of thinking like a scientist.
Your book has lots of good words to say about failure.
Sutton: I hate when failure happens, but it’s a necessary evil.
Pfeffer: You have to be willing to fail. If you’re playing golf and every ball goes into the cup, that means you’re either Tiger Woods or you’re standing too close to the cup.
Everyone talks about learning organizations, but if you’re learning, you’re obviously doing things that—by definition—you’re not really good at. You’re therefore going to fail. If I say to you, the first time you get on your bike, ‘You have to do it perfectly or I’ll cut off your legs,’ no child will ever learn to ride a bike. If I want you to learn, I’ll have to tolerate your not being good at first.
Sutton: So there’s no way you can do an empirical case or logical case without a high failure rate. Dean Simonton, who is a creativity researcher at UC-Davis, has studied all the greatest people and compared them to their ordinary contemporaries. Artists, scientists, composers—he’s got sample after sample. He always ends up finding that people who are most successful or famous in fields don’t have any lower failure rate than everyone else—they just do more.
Pfeffer: Effort and persistence are really undervalued.
Sutton: To put in a plug for the new Stanford design school—that’s one of the things we’re teaching students in terms of understanding a rapid-prototype culture, to just get out there and do stuff.
Pfeffer: But learn as they’re doing.
You warn that decisions need to be driven by evidence, not ideology. What organizational behavior in the world at large has the evidence clearly in place, but the evidence is going unheeded?
Sutton: Exhibit 1 is the field of education. We do the same stupid things over and over. The two extreme cases are incentive-based pay for teachers and social promotion. Incentive-based pay is actually very powerful and has a huge effect on behavior, but it’s so powerful that it has unintended consequences—like motivating teachers to cheat to boost test scores. Social promotion—the passing ahead of kids who aren’t qualified—goes against a lot of American values. But it’s the lesser of two evils. I think there are like 70 or 80 studies that show the same thing: that when you start holding kids back, test scores go down, dropout rates go up, school costs go way up as classes get bigger.
In a chapter that should warm the hearts of wage-earners everywhere, you say work shouldn’t be different from the rest of life, that people should not have to adapt to constrained corporate roles. Why not?
Pfeffer: It takes an enormous amount of psychological effort to try to go to work and remember that you can’t be who you are and have to be someone you aren’t. The example that opens the chapter is wonderful: an executive who starts off her career and she’s a very gregarious and boisterous and loud person who heard people say, ‘This is not how you behave here.’ So she decided to find a place where she could be herself or to create a place where people can be who they are.
DaVita is a very serious business—they do kidney dialysis—but the company encourages clients and employees to have fun. People always ask, how can you be boisterous and have games and dress up for the kidney dialysis center on Halloween? It’s a very serious business, and they suggest that that’s why it has to be fun: if you don’t relieve stress and tension with a certain amount of joy, it becomes just overbearing and burdensome. I think the biggest reason DaVita has the best mortality rates in the kidney dialysis industry is exactly this attitude, because emotions are contagious.
Sutton: There’s other damage beside the cost to individual authenticity. By letting people be themselves, organizations get new roles and skills that actually help the organization in the long term . . . . At Microsoft, the guys who were working on Direct
X were told to stop working on it over
and over again. Then Direct X became a huge business. Authenticity shines through despite, not because of, top management.
Pfeffer: And that’s relevant to strategy. You can’t always anticipate what’s going to be successful, you can’t always plan how markets will evolve, so you need to create opportunities for learning by doing. |